Reversing a History of Exclusion through International Labour Law

Claire Hobden

Although domestic workers provide crucial care services that make all other work possible, their labour too often is not seen as real work meriting legal protections. This view has resulted in 100 million women and girls left unprotected by national labour law in nearly half the world’s countries. Until recently, domestic workers were excluded even from international labour laws, which is symbolic of the slow evolution of social perceptions of women’s work generally and of domestic work in particular. Reducing the exploitation of domestic workers will therefore require both normative change to reverse the history of exclusion, and social change to actualize their rights. An international labour standard on the rights of domestic workers is essential to achieve both.

Whether it takes the shape of a binding convention or just a recommendation, an international labour standard for domestic workers is not a stand-alone answer. First, it would provide a minimum standard that purports to provide universal coverage; it constitutes a basis on which campaigns can seek more rights. Second, it gains effect only through implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and cultural change. Its use domestically as a campaign tool can increase its usefulness as a labour standard. If won, a binding convention is possibly the most effective way of holding states accountable by providing a baseline standard against which the promotion and protection of the rights of domestic workers can be monitored and enforced.

This article argues first that an international labour standard would extend necessary protections to domestic workers. Second, the standard-setting process provides a compelling campaign tool to mobilize domestic workers and raise awareness among states and civil society. Domestic workers are then empowered through their participation in drafting international law, and their input helps ensure the relevance of the standard. By virtue of their participation, domestic workers exercise their civil and political rights, gaining traction and increasing dialogue with their respective governments at the national level. Finally, their engagement provides an accountability mechanism, as international labour standards provide a role for civil society actors in the implementation of their rights.

Inclusion

The legislative exclusion of domestic workers is arguably one of the more egregious oversights in labour history. Even when arguing that domestic work is the product of global inequality, and that only structural change can transform the industry, we cannot deny that the culture of disrespect and undervaluing of domestic work is supported by legislative silence at the state and international levels. Despite provisions in existing human rights instruments and ILO conventions that address some of their concerns, domestic workers have been left out of labour legislation in about 40 per cent of countries (ILO, 2010) and excluded from many ILO conventions via a flexibility clause that allows governments to exclude certain limited categories of workers upon ratification of a convention. Such exclusionary practices underline the need to establish domestic worker rights through an international instrument that comprehensively addresses their specific concerns.

The lack of protection demands an international effort to identify good practices and establish a clear human rights framework. When there are no standards, the normative belief is that anything goes, and that there are no repercussions for abuse. Human rights reports denouncing abuses such as unpaid wages, long working hours without rest, insufficient provision of often inadequate food, substandard accommodation, forced labour, confinement, and emotional and sexual abuse provide ample evidence that such practice is the norm, not the exception (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Establishing fair labour standards makes a statement to both governments and societies about the value of labour, setting a minimum benchmark for employers and governments.

Campaign Tool

Negotiating an international standard is an opportunity for domestic workers to build their movements, raise awareness, and increase their policy influence nationally and internationally.

Labour movement history shows that a strong campaign builds movement, increases union membership, and raises consciousness. In some countries, domestic workers have been organizing locally for decades, using local and regional policy campaigns to encourage worker participation, build cross-sector alliances, and alter the discourse around domestic work through the media. Where domestic worker movements gained less traction locally, the ILO discussion on domestic work legitimized their struggles, drawing government and media attention.

Increased buy-in from these stakeholders then guides constituents to shift their perceptions of domestic work, egging on the fundamental social change that must accompany policy change to ensure effective implementation. Global multimedia dissemination of campaigns stimulates thinking on a topic that has remained invisible for centuries. Governments, international and domestic actors thus learn about domestic work, and are more likely to address the issues domestically.

The international standard-setting process also catalyzed transnational domestic worker organizing by providing a common platform. Such collaboration is imperative to protect migrant domestic workers in particular, providing worker organizations from sending and receiving countries with information of use to migrating domestic workers.

To be clear, the campaign for an ILO convention for domestic workers has not been a campaign for the sake of having a campaign. Although it serves to engage members and build networks, the goal remains establishing and implementing robust labour laws. Moreover, a successful campaign lifts the overall energy of a movement, inflating its power as a domestic force to reckon with.

Empowerment

Including domestic workers in negotiating an international labour standard serves to empower historically disenfranchised women and to ensure that the standard is relevant to the sector. Moreover, an ILO instrument would grant domestic workers the right to form or join trade unions, which is still denied to them in many countries.

Where historically they lacked access to international legislative processes, domestic workers had the rare opportunity to bring their demands directly to the international negotiating table at the International Labour Conference (ILC) through the organizing efforts of working women, mostly migrants from the South, via the International Domestic Worker Network (IDWN) and in partnership with the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Association (IUF). Though the ILO standard-setting process is tripartite, providing voting rights to governments, employers’ associations and national trade union centres, domestic workers are not yet unionized in most countries, and therefore are not always represented in national trade union centres with voting rights. However, thanks in part to the lobbying efforts of the IUF and IDWN, a number of trade union centres included domestic workers in their delegations, giving them a voice in the deliberation.(1) Shaping the international legislative agenda and participating in the discussion was a huge success for domestic workers and is a testament to the movement they have built. Their alliances with trade unions and other actors also strengthened their movement, building a strong foundation from which to implement and expand the standards achieved.

The ILC campaigns also empowered domestic workers domestically. Once added to the ILC agenda, domestic workers met with their respective labour ministries to sensitize them to their specific concerns and provide guidance on what rights they needed. Domestic workers in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, inter alia,(2) began consulting with their government months before the ILC, arguably shaping the stances of these governments that led the argument for a robust instrument.

Domestic worker participation had six results: it raised their profile at the national and international levels; substantiated the ILC debate; amplified their voices; increased their knowledge of international instruments; and built their movement through collaboration with trade unions. Finally, it empowered domestic workers locally to dialogue and cooperate with governments in implementing domestic worker rights. To take just one example, as a result of the partnerships forged in the preparatory phases of the ILC, the United States Department of Labor is collaborating with domestic worker organisations on regulatory reforms to improve domestic worker rights and protections.(3)

Accountability

Input from domestic workers leads not only to relevant legal standards, but also structures a role for domestic workers to hold employers and states accountable. International labour and human rights law evolved in part to protect individuals within a state’s borders, and to provide guidance to states in enacting laws and regulations. In turn, states are expected to ensure that employers remain compliant. The vulnerable status of domestic workers in most countries underlines the role of international law and accountability. International labour standards allow international institutions and domestic non-state actors to monitor the conditions of domestic workers, and, in cases of non-compliance, the ILO supervisory mechanisms provide workers’ (and employers’) organizations with the right to comment, make representations and lodge complaints against their government. As such, an international instrument is an important implementation tool for domestic workers.

Conclusion

Let us momentarily take the perspective that in a world free from inequality, there would be no need for domestic workers. The vast majority of the world sadly is far from such a utopia. Structural and economic overhaul is not likely to occur soon; and the social change needed to shift perceptions of domestic work will take generations to evolve. Meanwhile, 100 million women and girls worldwide suffer from a lack of protection. This is the immediate unjust reality that we must begin to address through international labour standards.

(1) Such was the case for the delegations of South Africa, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, Brazil, UK, US, and the Netherlands.
(2) Such consultations also took place in Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica, Tanzania, Namibia, Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, Peru and Mexico, with varying results.
(3) http://www.nationaldomesticworkeralliance.org/

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Claire Hobden is a junior project officer at the Bureau for Workers' Activities of the ILO. She was previously the organizational development coordinator at Domestic Workers United.

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References:

Human Rights Watch (2006) “Swept Under the Rug: Abuses against Domestic Workers Around the World”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18, No. 7(C). Available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11278/section/1

International Labour Office (2010) “Decent Work for Domestic Workers”, International Labour Conference, 99th Session, Report IV(1).  Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_104700.pdf

Time for a new Paradigm

Sharan Burrow

These are truly times for anger.

The world is barely re-emerging from the deepest economic crisis in a century, yet the very policies and mindset that caused the problem in the first place are back with a vengeance. Indeed, the world economy risks sliding back into crisis as dangerously short-sighted policies are put into place. The brave words of reform from world leaders in the G20 meetings of 2009 are now largely forgotten and have been replaced with the old scriptures of fiscal consolidation and calls to address the “fundamentals”.

And thus the world is fast slipping into a self-defeating round of “competitive austerity” where everyone seeks salvation from austerity at home through export-led growth. This is a strategy that might have worked for some for a time, but those days are gone: credit-driven consumption in a few key countries can no longer make up for the lack of wage-driven consumption worldwide.

Weakness in wage growth has been shown to be a prime cause of the crisis. This should come as no surprise: with globalization there has been a growing disconnection between wage growth and productivity. Whereas worker compensation rose in parallel with the improvement of productivity until the early 1980s, overly restrictive monetary policies, trade liberalization, labour market deregulation and employers’ strategies have combined since then to weaken this link. The consequences are now well documented: the share of labour income has dropped in most countries, inequalities have increased almost everywhere, and consumption has been maintained in large part through credit.

What is worse is that since the 1990s the decline in labour’s share of income has been highly pronounced in countries with trade surpluses (see Figure 1). In other words, the winners of the new global trading system have not shared those gains with their workforce… This is profitable for some individual companies, but it is bad for overall growth and prosperity. Ultimately it is unsustainable.

Figure 1: Change in wage share, 1995-2005

Source: World of Work Report 2010, ILO.

With unemployment and household debt still high in some of the key jurisdictions in the world (including both the U.S. and Europe) and with governments engaging in counter-productive austerity, it is more urgent than ever to ensure that workers get their fair share. More than a moral issue, it is also the only way to extricate ourselves from the current macroeconomic mess.

We need a fundamental change in paradigm. First, jobs and decent work can no longer be some collateral by-product of economic policies geared to rolling out the red carpet to “investors”. Full employment has to become anew the central objective of economic policy, and it should be expected that governments use all their levers – fiscal, monetary, regulatory and industrial – to achieve it. In parallel, we need active policies to improve workers’ capacity to engage in collective bargaining to link wages to productivity growth once again.

All of this will require new “rules of the game” internationally. As it stands, the current international economic and financial system has given the upper hand to speculators and tax evaders, fostered instability and put the burden of economic adjustment on the parties that were already experiencing difficult times. As a result, the fate of entire societies has not improved much over the past thirty years. This needs to change.

First, we need to reform the currency system to ensure that adjustment is not achieved mostly by deflating deficit countries, but through “reflating” surplus nations. In this way, the system would ensure that the adjustment led to more growth for all, not further wage and price depression. This idea is not new; it was first proposed by J.M. Keynes back in 1944 and has elicited renewed interest recently. Such a system would perhaps entail capital controls of some kind, but that would remain a lesser evil than the costs of disorder.

Second, we need new regulations on tax havens as well as on taxes on income and wealth. Controlling tax evasion and tax competition has to become a policy priority. At a time when the average working person is being asked to shoulder the bailout costs of the financial system, the least that can be asked is that all pay their fair share. Eliminating these loopholes is not nearly as complicated as some make it sound and would bring much needed resources into the fiscal purse. In the same spirit, the establishment of an international financial transactions tax to raise new resources would go a long way to make it possible for financially strapped governments to fund the necessary increase in Official Development Assistance to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as well as the mitigation costs of climate change. It has been estimated that, for the United States alone, such a tax would conservatively raise in the neighbourhood of $US170 billion, the equivalent of the entire funding of the MDG programme…

Last but not least, we need a renewed focus around the enhancement and respect of labour standards by all. When it comes to labour rights, the world faces a classic “free rider” problem. Now more than ever, it is essential to ensure a basic international social floor, that all countries endeavour to respect basic standards and that competitive advantage does not come at the expense of the “over-exploitation” of workers. If it is true that “labour is not a commodity”, the manner in which we achieve economic prosperity is as important as the goal itself.

None of these ideas is particularly radical. What sets them apart from the current orthodoxy is that they give prominence to workers’ needs and aspirations, and pragmatically define a “high” road to economic development.

The experience of the last three years shows that departures from economic orthodoxy are feasible at times when the “establishment” is going through near-death experiences, but that this does not have a lasting effect. In hindsight, the brief flirt with Keynesianism when the financial system was on the brink of collapse only lasted as long as it was needed to save the banks.

If during the crisis workers’ organisations could have anticipated that a new era of dialogue had begun, the moment has clearly passed. Our social “partners” have left the restaurant and presented us with the bill: austerity, tax increases, wage concessions, increased precariousness, public sector retrenchment, cuts in public pensions, and so on.

If much of the solution to our problem is international, trade unionists will have to find ways to exert their power and influence internationally as we confront the consequences of the crisis.

Both opinion polls and the wave of strikes and protests in many countries show the growing discontent with one-sided and short-sighted policy solutions.

In times of anger, the moment is certainly not for business as usual…

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Sharan Burrow is General Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).

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Europe’s Hidden Inequality

Michael Dauderstädt

The European Union (EU), in its founding treaties, set itself the aim of economic, social and territorial cohesion. This aim is generally interpreted to mean that the EU will strive to reduce income inequality within its area of integration. Reducing inequality is, as recent studies continue to show, an important and just goal since inequality blights the lives and prospects of those affected.

Unequal Income Distribution in Europe
As a result of a number of enlargement rounds since 1972 the EU consists of member states at widely varying stages of development and divergent income levels: besides small, rich countries, such as Luxembourg (annual per capita income: around 60,000 euros), there are also large, poor countries, such as Romania (annual per capita income: around 2,900 euros). A comparison of Europe’s regions reveals even more egregious differences between the richest region (Luxembourg) and the poorest: annual per capita income in the poorest regions of Bulgaria and Romania is even lower than the national average.

With a few exceptions, functional income distribution between wages and profits has long been deteriorating in the EU. The wage share has fallen, for example, in the countries of the Eurozone, from 68% in the 1970s to 57% in 2006. This deterioration in functional distribution, as well as more marked wage dispersion, also partly explains the deterioration in personal income distribution in most member states. Official Eurostat data confirm this trend showing increasing intra-country inequality, which is estimated through the S80/S20 ratio, i.e. the total income of the richest 20% divided by that of the poorest 20% of the respective population (a value of 4 meaning that the former earn four times more than the latter). By calculating the inequality within the EU as a whole as a weighted average of these intra-country values they give it a value of about 4.9, which has been rising over the past decade.

As far as the EU27 (the present EU with 27 member states) and the EU25 (minus Bulgaria and Romania) are concerned, the Eurostat figures – ranging between 4.5 and 5 – underestimate real inequality considerably. This is mainly because they present the (weighted) averages of the member states. These averages, however, abstract from the enormous differences in per capita income between the countries. Eurostat has not compared the incomes of what is really the richest quintile in the EU with those of the poorest, but erroneously assumes that the richest (or poorest) quintile is the sum of the richest (or poorest) quintiles of all member states.

In fact, the richest quintile consists predominantly of households in the richer member states, and includes even the second and third richest quintiles in those states, whose average income is still higher than that of the richest quintile in the poorer member states. The poorest EU quintile consists of the richer quintiles of the poorer member states (in Bulgaria and Romania, for example, from all quintiles). To ensure precision the 100 million (that is, about the size of one EU27 quintile) richest (or poorest) individuals in the EU would have to be identified and aggregated.

Realistic Estimate of Income Distribution: The EU Is More Unequal than India
If one makes the effort to construct realistic EU quintiles on the basis of the available EU data, an entirely different picture of the relationship between the richest and the poorest EU quintiles emerges (cf. Table 1). The first such estimate for 2004, based on World Bank data, yielded relatively low values(1); however, a methodologically more precise estimate(2) using EU data yields somewhat higher values. It makes a big difference whether incomes in the various member states are compared in terms of purchasing power or exchange rates. Since purchasing power in the poorer countries is higher (primarily because of lower rents and services), the differences are correspondingly lower.

Table 1: Income Distribution in the EU25 and EU27 by international comparison (total income of the richest 20% divided by that of the poorest 20% of the respective population.

* PPS: Purchasing Power Standard

Source: For the EU 2004: World Bank, Eurostat and author’s own calculations (Dauderstädt 2008); for the EU 2005–2008 Eurostat and author’s own calculations (Dauderstädt and Keltek); non-EU: World Bank.

Table 1 presents comparative figures based on World Bank data for China, India, Russia and the USA. World Bank data may be based on other measurement methods, but a comparison seems justified to the extent that the Bank’s data on inequality in individual EU member states comes very close to those of the EU. If one measures EU inequality in euros it comes out significantly higher for the EU27 than for all four large countries of comparison. The picture is rosier for the EU25, coming out at around the same level. Measured in purchasing power terms things look rosier still. However, as inequality within countries is measured in the respective national currency without taking into account regional purchasing power, a comparison with euro figures seems obvious.

The new estimates also make possible a more realistic view of the dynamics of inequality. While the official EU statistics report rising inequality, actual inequality between 2005 and 2008 was on a downward trend. This was due to the fall in inequality between countries which more than compensated for the increased inequality within EU states. It remains to be seen whether this trend will survive the recent crisis, which has severely reined in or even put into reverse the catch-up processes of some poorer member states. The final outcome will depend on how much growth has fallen in the richer countries in comparison.

From Inequality to Social Cohesion
The high inequality between states is increasing – mediated by the integration of the markets for goods, services, capital and labour in the EU – inequality within states. This effect was to be expected in the richer member states since wages there have come under pressure due to cheap imports, immigration and relocation of production. The same mechanisms should have improved distribution in the poorer countries. However, to the extent that it was visible at all, this effect could be observed only very late in the wake of strong – and apparently not sustainable, unfortunately – periods of growth from 2004.

The reduction of inequality, therefore, requires a dual approach in the form of measures to reduce inequality between and within member states. Domestically, wages should rise with productivity (plus the target inflation rate) in order to give workers a decent share in economic growth, which would also ensure more stable domestic demand and impede harmful competitive devaluations in real terms. Besides primary distribution, however, state redistribution also affects the extent of inequality. Transfers which substitute market incomes where they are lacking (for example pensions, social security, unemployment benefit, sick benefit) should increase in step with average per capita income.

The EU should monitor wage policy and issue clear warnings with regard to divergence in either direction (unrealistic wage increases or severe wage restraint). There should be a minimum wage policy to underpin this goal and to prevent a race to the bottom by paying immigrants and service providers at the wage level of the relevant host country. These problems will be assuaged to the extent that income and wage levels rise in the countries of origin. The reduction of inequality between states, therefore, makes a twofold contribution to social cohesion in Europe. As already mentioned, this has also been responsible for the progress made in recent years. However, if these catch-up and convergence processes were to slow down or even go into reverse, these successes would be put in jeopardy. Against the background of the crisis, therefore, the following policies are appropriate:

• Investment in poorer member states should be less dependent on the herd instinct of the capital markets and be funded to a greater extent through public financing channels, such as the European structural funds or the European Investment Bank. To that end, the EU’s own resources should be increased, with the raising of European taxes. Stricter regulation of the financial markets should avert the emergence of debt-driven bubbles.
• Admission to the Monetary Union or the adoption of the euro should no longer depend on attaining narrow inflationary and exchange rate goals since this forces countries to restrain appreciation of the national currency in real terms, which is a key element in catch-up processes.
• Enlargement policy should demand of candidate countries, besides the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, a minimum level with regard to income and income distribution, since the accession of poor and unequal countries hinders and even jeopardises social cohesion in the EU.

Finally, the EU should make available better and clearer statistical information on inequality in Europe. Eurostat should regularly publish data not only on relations between quintiles, but also on average per capita incomes for all quintiles in all member states, if possible going back to 1995 in order to make possible a realistic assessment of the evolution of income distribution.

(1) M. Dauderstädt (2007), Ungleichheit und sozialer Ausgleich in der erweiterten Europäischen Union, Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 88, 4, April, 261–269.
(2) Dauderstädt and Keltek (2011) ‘Immeasurable Inequality in the European Union’ Intereconomics Vol. 46/1 pp.44-51.

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Michael Dauderstädt is the director of the division for Economic and Social Policy at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

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Further reading:
Michael Dauderstädt and Cem Keltek (2011) Immeasurable Inequality in the European Union, Intereconomics Vol. 46/1 pp.44-51. Available online at: http://www.intereconomics.eu/

Domestic Workers in Switzerland protected by the Country’s first Sectoral Employment Contract

Mauro Moretto

Vania Alleva

In Switzerland as elsewhere, the State has been retreating on social policy in recent years. This is leading to a decline in social service provision and, consequently, to an increase in demand for domestically based services. Nobody knows exactly how many waged employees are currently at work in Swiss private households (as many are unreported), but statistical estimates suggest that their numbers are continually increasing. At the end of 2007, the Unia trade union, on the basis of various studies(1), put the number of full-time jobs in the sector at about 125,000 (approx. 4 per cent of the total workforce). More than 90 per cent of these employees are women. Many are migrants, often without any legal residency status. They come from a whole range of countries where they had often previously gained academic qualifications and worked in other occupations. Recently, increasing numbers of women from the new EU member states have been finding jobs in Swiss private households.

Fighting low wages and poor working conditions

Despite the legal risks, and other incentives to stay hidden, more and more private household workers are venturing out to see Unia. They report appalling working conditions: extremely low wages, combined with hefty deductions for board and lodging, often no social security or pension coverage, massive daily workloads, pay stoppages if they fall ill or if the employer goes on vacation, uncompensated work on public holidays, obviously no overtime arrangements, and so on. No wonder that all the available studies pinpoint this sector as the one with the highest proportion of precarious employment relationships and working poor.

For more than ten years now Unia has, together with other unions in the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (SGB/USS), been fighting against the social scandal of the working poor and for substantial pay rises in low-wage sectors. At the turn of the 21st century, it chalked up some important successes in sectors such as hospitality and retailing. However, as Switzerland still does not have a general legal minimum wage, this struggle runs up against certain limits – especially where there is no organized negotiating partner on the employer side with whom to agree on binding minimum wages. As that applies particularly to domestic workers, Unia and the SGB/USS called on the Swiss government, at the end of 2007, to make use of the legal possibilities that were created as part of the accompanying measures for the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the European Union, and to decree for this category of workers the first-ever Switzerland-wide “standard work contract” (Normalarbeitsvertrag or NAV) with binding minimum wages and working conditions. An NAV is not a collective agreement, but a sector-specific legal minimum wage for sectors in which there are no collectively agreed provisions.

At the same time, Unia drew public attention to the highly precarious working conditions experienced by domestic employees. The government finally took up the union concerns and asked an experts group to work out the parameters for an NAV with binding minimum wages. Taking part in that group were representatives of the cantonal and national authorities, employer organizations, and organizations in related sectors (cleaning and hospitality), as well as the authors of the present article, who were representing the unions. The experts group reported back in mid-2009 with a proposed NAV that took account of multiple elements and requirements. The main focus was on the setting of minimum wages that would reflect the wide-ranging and physically demanding tasks involved in private domestic work. Concretely, the experts’ group defined three wage categories on the basis of experience and training: 1. untrained employees, 2. experienced employees and 3. employees with vocational training or long experience. For the domestic employees’ protection and security, other elements going beyond the legal requirements are vital. Among them are working time arrangements (including overtime), holidays and leave, and the continued payment of wages in case of illness. Although the Unia representatives pressed for these elements to be included in the proposed NAV, they were left out – both because they are covered by existing cantonal NAVs and because the legislation underpinning national NAVs does not provide for them.

A first step in the right direction

On its way through the political and administrative procedures, the draft NAV had to overcome some resistance and many hurdles. Some cuts also had to be accepted, notably to the effective minimum wage levels, before the national government decreed the first NAV for domestic employees, with binding minimum wages and the force of law, in October 2010 (see here the full text of the law in German, French and Italian) . To date, this is the only national-level NAV, so its significance goes beyond the sector for which it was adopted.

The NAV came into force on 1 January 2011, and it is an important step in the right direction. The compulsory minimum wages are:

• CHF 18.20 per hour for untrained workers


• CHF 20.00 per hour for untrained workers with 4 years of professional experience or for workers with two years’ training


• CHF 22.00 per hour for workers with three years’ training.

That is less than the experts group proposed, but it is nonetheless a significant improvement on the current situation and it sends out an important signal to domestic workers employed in Switzerland. The minimum wage for untrained domestic employees corresponds to about 55 per cent of the average gross wage. The mandate given to the group had specified that the minimum wages set for domestic employees were under no circumstances to exceed the minimum wages negotiated by the social partners for the related cleaning and hospitality sectors. But by pointing to the many different tasks performed by domestic workers, who for example often help to care for children and elderly people, the experts were able to justify a partial waiver of this requirement. For these minimum hourly wages to apply, a domestic employee must work on average at least 5 hours a week for the same employer. The main reason for this is that home helps who clean several households on a purely hourly basis in fact earn considerably more (as a rule, CHF 25.00 or more) and are therefore scarcely affected by wage dumping.

The Swiss delegation will now be in a good position, at the International Labour Conference in June 2011, to push hard for the adoption of the new Convention that will enshrine fair employment conditions for domestic workers worldwide.

Implementation: an uphill task

Now for the difficult, challenging part - implementation. Ever since 1 July 2004, the canton of Geneva has had its own domestic workers’ NAV with minimum wages – a precursor to the national NAV. So far, experiences with it have been very positive. Admittedly, it is difficult to monitor whether the NAV is being correctly applied, as we often do not know in which households domestic employees are working. But word has increasingly got around among these workers that the NAV gives them certain rights. And when necessary, they do go to the labour courts to get those rights upheld. The highest-profile case was won by Unia Geneva, which secured back payments of CHF 70,000 for a married couple who were both working as domestic employees. The NAV does provide protection, and it enables employees to defend their rights more effectively. The experience in Geneva shows that employers want to avoid the courts and will often, in case of dispute, pay up the minimum wage without further ado. Employers are also better informed about their duties.

In the case of the national NAV on domestic work, verification is seriously hampered by the opaque and fragmented nature of this part of the labour market. Monitoring of compliance with the NAV is first and foremost the task of the tripartite commissions in the cantons. Thanks to the binding minimum wage rates embodied in the NAV, these commissions have been provided with the instrument they need in order to ensure and enforce, at the very least, effective protection against wage dumping. To get the new NAV applied, the tripartite monitoring bodies will need to be supported with various instruments, including broad information campaigns aimed at both employers and employees.

Still to be tackled is the question of the residency status of domestic employees from non-EU countries. Although the degree of exploitation certainly does not depend on residency status alone, the demand for the regularization of undocumented immigrants remains crucial. Only through such legal security can lasting improvements be achieved in the living and working conditions of these employees and their families. Beyond regularization, it is absolutely crucial to de-couple access to courts from the residency status of migrants; this will go a long way in reducing their precariousness.

Information and targeted union organizing

There are also challenges for Unia and other organizations engaged in this field. As domestic employees cannot be informed and organized at their workplaces, alternative locations have to be sought or created. Essential to this is the closer networking of trade unions, migrants’ associations with strong representation of women, and organizations working in the migration field. Here, Unia in particular can build on its long years of cooperation with the many associations through which migrants maintain links with their countries of origin. The union’s experience as an intercultural mediator must be adapted to the domestic workers’ situation. Conscious efforts must be made to recruit and train contact persons and reps who know the specific living and working circumstances of domestic employees and speak their language. Equally, social and political alliances are needed in order to offset the limited scope for self-organization. This entails organising targeted information meetings, language courses, or integration courses, which promote empowerment, exchanges of experience and collective processes.

(1) Including Alleva, V. and Niklaus, P-A (2004) Leben und Arbeiten im Schatten. Studie der Anlaufstelle für Sans-Papiers und GBI, Basel: ECOPLAN.

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Vania Alleva is a member of the executive committee and leader of the service sector branch of Unia, the Swiss inter-professional trade union.
Mauro Moretto is a member of the leadership of Unia's service sector branch.

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