Short-run stabilisation policies will not do: the case for a Keynesian New Deal at the European and global level

Eckhard Hein

The world economy is still struggling with its most severe crisis since the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s. On the one hand, the present crisis began as a financial crisis which started with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the US in summer 2007, which then gained momentum with the breakdown of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and reached another climax with the Euro crisis in early to mid 2010. On the other hand, the present crisis began as a real crisis well before the financial crisis, with an economic downswing in the US. The financial crisis and the real crisis reinforced each other, and the world economy was hit by a decline in real GDP in 2009 – something not seen for generations. Major regions in the world are only slowly recovering from this decline, in particular the Euro area, the UK and Japan. Furthermore, none of the economies which have been hit severely will have returned to the pre-crisis growth path by the end of 2010. Therefore, massive underutilisation of productive capacity, high unemployment and a downward pressure on wages will have to be tackled in the future.

Beyond inefficient regulation of financial markets, increasing inequalities in income distribution and rising current account imbalances at the global scale and within the Euro area are the main underlying causes for the severity of the global financial and economic crisis and for the recent euro crisis. The US and Germany are two important complementary examples of current account imbalances, the US being the major current account deficit country and Germany one of the important current account surplus countries.

The credit-financed consumption boom in the US prior to the crisis was highly fragile because it was set against a background of rising inequalities and a falling labour income share. Domestically the US had to rely on rising property prices in order to allow for increasing indebtedness to fuel steady increases in consumption demand. Regarding the relationship with the rest of the world, a sharp depreciation of the US-dollar, which would have been required in order to improve international price competitiveness of US producers and thus the current account, had to be avoided in order to guarantee steady capital imports without having to raise domestic interest rates. The erosion of such a constellation in the subprime mortgage crisis and the following downswing not only affected the US, but also the rest of the world, in particular the current account surplus countries. On the one hand, if their capital exports were into highly speculative US markets they were devalued by the financial crisis, and therefore the financial crisis quickly infected these surplus countries. On the other hand, the markets for exports collapsed and the current account surplus countries were thus infected by the real crisis as well.

While the dynamic consumption-driven model of the US had to rely on the willingness and the ability of private households to go into debt – and of the rest of the world to supply credit – the stagnating German neo-mercantilist model aiming at increasing net exports by means of wage moderation, in particular, had to rely on the willingness and the ability of the rest of the world to go into debt. This German model was thus as fragile as the US model. The moderate growth rates were dependent on the dynamic growth of export markets, while increasing capital exports carried the risk of contagion in the case of a financial crisis.

The German strategy was not only suboptimal for Germany; it has also been a major reason for the current account imbalances within the Euro area which are at the roots of the Euro crisis in 2010. Germany’s consistently weak domestic demand growth, as well as its rising international competitiveness due to extremely moderate wage developments, has been a drag for other Euro area economies which had to accept negative current account balances, in some countries (Spain, Ireland) mainly associated with private sector deficits, in others (Greece, Portugal) also with public sector deficits. In the course of the crisis, public sector deficits and debts in these countries increased because of fiscal stabilisation, making liberalised financial markets speculate about the sustainability of this process. Of course, the housing price bubbles, particularly in Ireland and Spain, as well as too expansive fiscal policies and wage developments in the deficit countries have also contributed to the current account imbalances within the Euro area.

The breakdown of the world economy in the financial and economic crisis could finally be halted by monetary policy interventions providing liquidity on a massive scale and, in particular, by massive fiscal expenditure programmes. A collapse of the Euro area could be prevented in the short run by the intervention of the IMF in cooperation with the other Euro area countries bailing out Greece. However, due to the underlying imbalances, the world economy is unlikely to return to its pre-crisis growth path. In particular, the US will not be able to act as the driver of world demand any longer. The European Union or the Euro area are far from replacing the US as a world demand engine and rather suffer from their internal contradictions, mainly caused by the German neo-mercantilist economic policy strategy. Therefore, major parts of the world economy are presently threatened by a period of deflationary stagnation, high unemployment and pressure on wages; in particular when fiscal expansion comes to an end and governments attempt to reduce public deficits and debt. For the Euro area this will be accompanied by the threat of disintegration.

What is required in the present constellation in order to turn towards a sustainable growth path with (close to) full employment and to rescue the Euro area is a Keynesian New Deal at the European and the global level. The policy package of a Keynesian New Deal should address the three main causes of the severe crisis: inefficient regulation, increasing inequality in income distribution and imbalances at the global and the European scale. It should thus consist of three pillars:

(i) Re-regulation of the financial (and the real) sector. This includes measures, which increase transparency and reduce asymmetric information and thus uncertainty in financial markets, generate incentives for long-run growth, and contain systemic instability.

(ii) Re-orientation of macroeconomic policies along (post-)Keynesian lines. Monetary policies by central banks should target low real interest rates and should care for stability of the financial sector. Wage and incomes policies should take over responsibility for stable inflation rates and stable income shares, which implies that nominal wages should rise at a rate given by the sum of economy wide productivity growth trend plus the inflation target. Fiscal policies should take care of real stabilisation in the short and the long run and of a more equal distribution of income and wealth. The latter implies active redistribution policies by means of tax and social policies. The former requires that governments run permanent deficits (surpluses) in order to maintain aggregate demand at a level consistent with full employment, stable inflation, and a roughly balanced current account in the long run, and that they actively fight short-run shocks by means of counter-cyclical fiscal policies.

(iii) Re-construction of international macroeconomic policy co-ordination – in particular on the European level – and a new world financial order. On the European level, the institutional setting of the ECB and its monetary policy strategy have to be modified such that the ECB is induced to pursue a long-run monetary policy of low real interest rates. The Stability and Growth Pact has to be replaced by a means of coordination of national fiscal policies which allows for the short- and long-run stabilising role of fiscal policies. External stability, i.e. sustainable external balances, should be a primary target, and member countries should be symmetrically induced to correct for current account surpluses and deficits. The orientation of labour market and social policies towards deregulation and flexibilisation will have to be abandoned in favour of re-organising labour markets, stabilising labour unions and employer associations, and Euro area-wide minimum wage legislation. On the global level, the return towards a world financial order with fixed but adjustable exchange rates, symmetric adjustment obligations for current account deficit and surplus countries, and regulated international capital markets, as suggested by Keynes’s (1942) proposal for an International Clearing Union, should be attempted in order to cope with the imbalances that have caused the present crisis.

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Eckhard Hein is a Professor of Economics at the Berlin School of Economics and Law.

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Further reading
Eckhard Hein and Achim Truger (2010): Finance-dominated capitalism in crisis – the case for a global Keynesian New Deal, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy, Working Paper 6/2010:
http://www.ipe-berlin.org/fileadmin/downloads/working_paper/ipe_working_paper_06.pdf

The German economic model emerges reinforced from the crisis

Stefan Beck

Christoph Scherrer

For years, the business press has portrayed the German economic model as hopelessly atavistic in the face of dynamic Anglo-Saxon financial innovation and comparatively high growth rates. Recently, however, the economic historian Werner Abelshauser argued that the financial crisis would vindicate the German model of capitalism. In his view, the fading lustre of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, in particular its model of corporate governance and dominance of shareholder value, should again lead to the German or “Rhenish” model of diversified quality production and its institutions becoming more attractive.

We argue here that Germany’s response to the crisis has reinforced the central strategies and core institutions of the German economy. At the same time, the model has become more and more exclusive and has begun to foster European and international economic imbalances.

One of the German model’s most salient lines of continuity is the maintenance of a trade surplus. After the period of stagflation in the 1970s, the Bundesbank reacted with policies focusing on rigid monetary and currency stability, in which priority was given to price stability. As a result, domestic consumption was stifled while exports remained the main source of growth. The focus on exports was shared by the trade unions, including the most powerful among them, IG Metall which supported the drive for productivity through the institutions of co-determination, and ensured that unit labour costs would not be driven up by wage demands exceeding productivity gains. The success of this strategy led to the coinage of the term “Modell Deutschland” in the mid-1970s.

Socially and economically, the model became less inclusive long before the financial crisis hit. In particular, the reforms of the social democratic and green coalition government of Chancellor Schröder shifted the German model towards institutional deregulation and a price-competitive strategy that included moderate wage increases, tax cuts and fiscal consolidation.  Its core objective, however, remained the same: fostering growth through exports. During the present crisis, the focus on companies’ core workforces has been reinforced.

The impact of the Financial Crisis
Unlike the US and many European countries, Germany did not enjoy a debt-driven real estate boom before the crisis. The resulting slower growth in comparison to its neighbours made Germany the object of much ridicule in the business press. In the absence of a real estate bubble, however, one would have expected that Germany might have survived the crisis unscathed. In fact, the German government believed that because of a lack of exuberance, its economy would be rather immune; which explains why the government acted rather belatedly to the crisis that eventually hit Germany at the end of 2008. It reached the German economy via two channels, the first being finance. Many of its banks were overexposed to “toxic” speculative papers originating mainly in the US and Ireland. Some of the big private banks, especially Commerzbank and Hypo Real Estate, and top public banks (the Landesbanken) had to be rescued by public guarantees of gargantuan proportions, totalling €400 billion. The more important channel, however, was trade. The export industry, the heart of the German model suffered immensely through the collapse of international demand. The automobile industry, in particular, suffered because of the overlap of the financial crisis with the energy crisis. The capital goods industry lost sales because consumer industries postponed capital investments when faced with a drop in demand.

The most visible outcome of the German model, its export success, proved to be the Achilles heel of its economy. However, the German model of close cooperation proved its worth. Despite the significant decline in GDP of 5%, job losses were miniscule (about 80.000 or 0.3 %). Some elements of the German model contributed to this “miracle”. General stabilizers of the welfare state made intentional deficit spending less necessary. Whereas discretionary measures to re-inflate the economy (Konjunkturpakete I & II) accounted only for €78 billion for the years 2009 and 2010, i.e. around 3.3 % of government expenditure per year, overall government expenditure increased in 2009 by 5%. These stabilizers were enhanced by the willingness of the government to fund part-time support for workers. In 2009 the duration of part-time support was extended up to 24 months and its use reached a maximum of 1.5 million workers in May 2009 (compared to 70.000 in 2007) and then dropped again to around 900.000 workers in the first quarter of 2010. Expenditures of the Federal Employment Agency for short-term work totalled more than €5 billion in 2009.

Industry-wide collective bargaining brought about noticeable real wage losses. According to the ILO Global Wage Report, in 2008 and 2009, German workers had to accept a decline in monthly real wages of more than 0.5% (ILO 2009). Decentralisation and co-management bore fruit: In about 30% of all firms, overtime accounts have been reduced – some even going negative (“Zeitschulden”), one out of four firms reduced the use of subcontracted work, and nearly every third used other measures to increase internal flexibility. In sum, about 1.2 million jobs were preserved by reductions of working time. Lay-offs predominantly hit workers with temporary contracts.

Co-determination was also defended in another arena. The attempt to rid VW, Europe’s largest car manufacturer, of state and trade union influence, failed. Under Chancellor Merkel, the federal government successfully retained the stake of the German State of Niedersachsen in VW, despite attacks from the European Commission. Because of this state’s stake in VW, the Porsche’s strategy to finance a takeover of VW, with cash from VW, was muted. Instead, VW took over Porsche, allowing the work council of VW to retain a strong voice. At the end of 2009, exports had picked up again and seemed to justify the current strategy.

The core of the German model, close cooperation of capital, labour and the state in pursuit of export surpluses, has actually been strengthened in the crisis. Success of the corporatist crisis management, however, may bring about the German model’s own demise, with export success perhaps squeezing out neighbours who cannot shield themselves via currency depreciations - e.g. southern EU members.

International consequences of Germany’s trade surplus and macroeconomic restraint strategy of growth
The Greek and Euro crises in 2009 and 2010 were portrayed by the German government and by most of the media as the result of a weak, spent-thrift government. In contrast, the German objective of budgetary parsimony was praised as virtuous and, accordingly, strict loan conditions for Greece were seen as wholly justified.

Surely, in the case of Greece it is easy to identify homemade causes of the crisis. However, there are also systemic reasons for the Greek crisis, which are related to Germany’s export success. Since 1999 German unit labour costs remained nearly constant, whereas the average of the European Currency Union rose about 15% and those of Greece, Portugal or Spain between 20 and 30%. Additionally, trade and current account deficits of these latter countries have increased in parallel to comparative unit labour costs, and disproportionally since the introduction of the Euro.

From a Post-Keynesian perspective this mercantilist strategy of perpetual trade or current account surpluses is a kind of beggar-thy-neighbour-policy. It aims at fostering the growth of one’s own economy and rate of employment at the expense of other countries. And given the fact that countries cannot sustain permanent deficits without rising indebtedness vis-à-vis foreign countries, such mercantilist strategies can force countries into insolvency. Moreover, such developments have internationally contractive effects on growth and can provoke economic and political instabilities. In the end, deflationary tendencies stemming from Germany and balance of payment and/or budgetary problems of deficit countries are two sides of the same coin.

The German model after the financial crisis
In sum, the German economic model was hit hard by the crisis but proved surprisingly resilient. Actually, its core, the willingness of all major stakeholders to work together in securing the export prowess of German industry, emerged from the test of the crisis stronger than ever. With the help of state subsidies, employers kept their long-term commitments to core workers, and in return, organisations representing skilled workers, i.e. work councils and trade unions, were willing to make concessions in terms of pay and working conditions. But whereas now some of those core workers (e.g. BMW) are receiving extra or ‘compensatory’ payments in return for their loyalty, temp workers and workers outside the export industry are bearing the brunt of the crisis as new levels of public indebtedness are leading to budgetary constraints whose first victims are again those on welfare.

While voices within and outside of Germany call for strengthening domestic consumption, the recent resurgence of exports seems to vindicate the export coalition. Therefore, it does not look very likely that the German economic model will be restructured in favour of less dependence on trade surpluses and further tensions within the euro zone are therefore highly likely.

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Stefan Beck worked as a research assistant at the University of Kassel. He is currently preparing his dissertation about mercantilism and the German economic model.

Christoph Scherrer is Professor for Globalization and Politics at University of Kassel, Germany. He is also executive director of the International Center for Development and Decent Work and a member of the steering committee of the Global Labour University.

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References

• Abelshauser, W. (2009): Der Kulturkampf geht weiter; in: WSI Mitteilungen 12/2009: 692-694.
• Bogedan, C. et al. (2009): Betriebliche Beschäftigungssicherung in der Krise; Kurzauswertung der WSI-Betriebsrätebefragung 2009; Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
• Herr, H. (2009): Vom regulierten Kapitalismus zur Instabilität; in: WSI Mitteilungen 12/2009: 635-642.
• Müller, K./Schmidt, R. (2010): Von der griechischen zur europäischen Krise; in: Prokla 159: 277-300.

Trade, labour and the crisis: Time to rethink trade!

Esther Busser

Trade has been one of the main transmission channels of the financial and economic crisis to developing countries where many jobs were lost in export sectors. This was largely due to a reduced demand for goods in industrialised economies as well as to a lack of access to credit for the financing of exports.

At the international level, calls against protectionism (that is, increasing barriers to trade) have been manifold. These calls have been made in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Global Jobs Pact, G-20 Declarations and government declarations in organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Despite these calls and the common understanding that closing off markets would have negative effects and risk a further deepening of the crisis, several countries have resorted to protectionist measures.

Discussions around trade and the crisis have mainly focused on whether countries have resorted to protectionist measures, the nature of these measures as well as their impacts. However, this discussion only reflects a part of the overall picture on the role of trade in the crisis. It does not touch on its role in promoting a sustainable recovery and in addressing the underlying imbalances in world trade. Two important questions, therefore, need to be raised. The first is whether the pre-crisis model of export-led growth in some countries and debt-fuelled consumption in others is sustainable. The second is whether the outcomes of export-led growth have indeed been beneficial for the long-term employment and development perspectives of developing countries.

The crisis has shown that the push for trade liberalisation and open markets over the past couple of decades, as promoted by the WTO, the major economies and Transnational Corporations (TNCs), has resulted in an export or “market access” focused trade model, which in turn has created a situation where many countries became dependent on export markets for their growth. Such a situation makes them vulnerable in cases of shocks, like in the current crisis, particularly when demand drops simultaneously in all markets, resulting in job losses. This constitutes a crucial difference with the Asian financial crisis, which limited itself to Asian countries and allowed them to export themselves out of their crisis, an option not available currently.

Several voices have been calling for a rebalancing of trade, not only to reduce vulnerability to trade shocks but, more importantly, to rebalance global demand. Such voices have been expressed in several fora, including in the G-20, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ILO and other United Nations (UN) organisations. Such a rebalancing would require less dependence on export markets and more emphasis on creating diversified domestic markets in all countries, that are based on consumption and wage led growth as well as a re-establishment of wage-productivity linkages.

However, these calls for rebalancing are made amidst the dominance of a free trade paradigm. The “no protectionism” slogan is regularly accompanied by a call for “further trade liberalisation”. Mixing the two is problematic, especially when it comes to rebalancing efforts that do require a substantial rethinking of the role of trade and trade liberalisation in sustainable recovery and development. The recent G-20 Toronto statement that calls upon “the OECD, the ILO, World Bank and the WTO to report on the benefits of trade liberalisation for employment and growth at the Seoul Summit” clearly shows how the current drive for trade liberalisation continues to reign.

Moreover, this rebalancing exercise questions the long-term growth perspectives to be achieved in developing countries by free trade and the current specialisation pattern. The vulnerabilities of developing countries are unfortunately not only limited to their dependence on export markets, but also to specialisation in low value added activities in highly competitive markets.

Despite some diversification and industrialisation successes, particularly in Asia and in a few Latin American countries, many developing countries have witnessed a specialisation in limited numbers of low value-added economic activities. This strategy has not only increased the dependency of these countries on export markets, but it has also failed to bring about diversification and to substantially raise income levels and decent work opportunities. Trade liberalisation has played a major role in this process. An exclusive focus on trade liberalisation has forced countries to specialise in products in which they have a so-called natural comparative advantage, either in agriculture and natural resources or in low value added and labour intensive manufacturing. This is problematic because commodities and low value added manufacturing (such as textiles and clothing) are characterised by highly competitive markets, low prices, low productivity gains, low wages, poor working conditions and powerful supply chains that have reinforced competition and a race to the bottom. In other words, specialising in production in which developing countries have a natural comparative advantage only allows for limited productivity and wage improvements. In such a context, creating decent employment and higher levels of income remains difficult and rather challenging. Strategies that only focus on entering and stagnating in the lower ends of global supply chains are therefore problematic and limit prospects for a diversified economy.

A rebalancing approach should thus aim at creating decent and productive employment through diversification of economies. This would entail increasing productivity in sectors such as agriculture while at the same time building comparative advantage and productive capacity in higher value added activities characterised by increasing returns to investment and a higher potential for productivity gains. Such a strategy for development is not only the key to more productive employment, higher wages and decent working conditions, but also instrumental in increasing aggregate demand and stimulating the growth of domestic markets.

What is important to understand, though, is that such a development and rebalancing strategy is only possible if governments reinvigorate their developmental role, build the relevant institutions, diversify their economies and adopt pro-active and strategic trade and industrial policies. The challenge is to recognise again the importance of these policy instruments aimed at putting diversification, productivity increases in agriculture, industrial development and structural transformation at the top of the agenda if decent and productive employment is to be delivered. This can only be done if trade agreements and trade liberalisation are looked at in a different way and assessed on the basis of their impacts on development and decent work. Unfortunately, over the last two to three decades, countries have been set on a path of trade liberalisation that has largely eliminated such instruments and policy space through commitments in trade and investment agreements.

Such policy space is crucial if countries currently confined to low value added activities want to move up the value chain, diversify their economies and rely more on domestic and wage led growth. Experiences in industrialised countries and successful emerging economies have shown that trade liberalisation has to be gradual to allow economies to build up their productive capacity and specialise in the right activities. There is an important role for the state in channeling investment, protecting domestic markets, providing access to finance and attracting new technology. A variety of policy instruments will be necessary to ensure industrial development. Such instruments do include the strategic and flexible use of tariffs (low for inputs and higher on products in which competitiveness is being developed), subsidies, reverse engineering, local content and other investment requirements, export taxes and so on. Many of these instruments have either been prohibited or strongly limited by current trade agreements.

Although the Doha round seems stalled, the demands to revive it are frequent and the aggressive bilateral trade liberalisation led by the US and the EU continues more than ever, reducing much of the remaining policy space for developing countries. In a similar way policy space is being reduced in developing countries that are in the process of accession to the WTO, slashing their tariffs, opening up their services and reducing their policy space far beyond that of WTO members with comparable levels of development, thus having a strong impact on their long term development perspectives. A much more viable strategy would be to promote regional integration, diversification and development. Unfortunately the current drive for liberalisation hinders such regional strategies.

Governments will have to shift from a laissez-faire approach in trade to a more active role whose core objective is the creation of decent and productive employment through industrialisation and structural transformation. To put industrial policies high on the agenda again requires a serious reconsideration of the current free trade paradigm. Instead of eliminating vital policy space, a new trade regime should actively promote the use of it, as some protection will be needed to enable industrialisation and create decent work. A new trade regime such as this is imperative if a sustainable recovery is to become a reality.

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Esther Busser is the Assistant Director in the Geneva Office of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) since February 2009. She previously worked as trade policy advisor for the ITUC from 2003-2009.

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(1) G-20 Toronto summit declaration : http://g20.gc.ca/toronto-summit/summit-documents/the-g-20-toronto-summit-declaration/

For a real European Industrial Policy

Peter Scherrer

The term ‘Industrial Policy’ refers to various concepts ranging from providing an environment conducive for private business to targeted state intervention on industrial sectors, with numerous dimensions. This article focuses on what the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) is demanding with regard to the issue of development skills, training and qualification. The European metalworking industries and the jobs these industries provide will be sustainable only when a well-trained and highly qualified workforce is able to produce competitive goods for a global market. On a long term perspective the production of “greener”(1) products will be the base for successful participation in the global economy.

It should be noted from the outset that the recent past has shown that many industrialised EU Member States have tended to search for solutions at national level rather than through increased European co-operation. This trend can also be seen in the abandonment of large projects involving high cross-border cooperation such as the Airbus project. This reduction in co-operation between EU Member States has serious implications for the development of skills as the huge financial investments required for big industrial projects, in particular for the R&D costs, can no longer be provided by a single Government budget, especially not during a far-reaching financial and economic crisis.

Watching the disaster in connection with possible financial aid for General Motors Europe for their restructuring programme, one can see how easy it becomes for management not only to play off the workers of one plant against another, but also to play off one Government against another. It seems that either politicians have not learnt their lessons or that pre-national election pressure is preventing them from drawing the obvious conclusions from the recent political and economic developments. Being in the metal industry involves having a slightly longer perspective than the next four years because many of the investments will be profitable only after many years. The steel, shipbuilding and automobile industries require strategic thinking and investment over decades. This might be the main reason why many trade unionists in Europe are deeply worried about the future of the manufacturing industry. Industrial policy can only be successful when it is carried out using a long-term, sustainable approach.

The importance of industrial production
Maintaining and strengthening Europe’s industrial base is fundamental to securing the foundation and transformation of the EU economy and ensuring employment, social progress and cohesion in the future. Manufacturing industries are significant employment creators. Currently, manufacturing (excluding construction) is directly responsible for 20% of GDP in the EU-27, and an equal proportion in the euro-zone. Industrial goods account for the bulk of intra-EU trade at approximately 80%. Production growth in manufacturing industries has underpinned economic growth in Europe, with significant national and regional differences. The weight of manufacturing in the economy is heavier than employment in terms of value added in 19 of the 27 EU Member States, which indicates relatively high labour productivity. European manufacturing industry employs close to 40 million workers(2). Moreover, manufacturing provides employment multipliers through strong backward and forward linkages to other sectors in the economy and drives demand for industry-related services: every industrial job creates substantial numbers of additional jobs in the service sectors. The worsening economic climate is reflected in the fact that job losses arising from restructuring outnumber jobs created by nearly two to one - with the car sector hit harder than other sectors. With social Europe all but stalled, restructuring has been taking place in a virtual social vacuum at EU level. The negative effects of restructuring are still mainly to be dealt with by the national Governments. The EU globalisation and adjustment fund and the European Social and regional funds are too small to be an effective and decisive support. A much more developed social and employment policy on a European level is needed.

Skills and Know-how
Adapting to economic and climate change necessitates a comprehensive approach to new skills and competencies. The only way for Europe to foster economic growth and maintain its industrial base, while ensuring social progress and promoting environmental sustainability, is through technological and social innovation. Innovation is the primary driver of a successful and sustainable industrial policy. A strong lead in R&D and innovation is Europe’s key competitive advantage and of central importance in finding solutions to social and environmental challenges. The European Commission is trying to react to this by creating “Skill Councils” in various sectors of the economy. The skills of the qualified work force in Europe are still the basis for the successful performance of European companies on the global market.

To achieve a truly sustainable, positive effect for manufacturing industry and the workforce it employs, the EU and its Members States should aim to avoid the relocation of manufacturing activities and related services (e.g. R&D, ICT) and support the permanent upgrading of its European industrial sectors (e.g. by paying more attention in the European framework programmes to industry-related research).

There is an urgent need to achieve and strengthen the “Barcelona objective” of investing 3% of GDP (whereof 1% public R&D) in research and development through more qualitative objectives (e.g. more efficient use of financial resources, a more effective European research system, creation of sufficient critical mass, closer links with society and a better use of public-private partnerships to promote technology and innovation).

The European Community must also support the development of innovation alongside R&D, i.e. promoting new processes, products and services by applying existing scientific knowledge in new ways, recognising that innovation is more than technological innovation and includes also issues such as new concepts for logistics or marketing, organisational innovation, workplace development, business model innovation, product design and product quality. The EMF considers that a better common understanding of and a much more coordinated European approach to non-technological innovation is needed. In its Industrial Policy Manifesto, the EMF calls for the development of a new, broader understanding of innovation that does not equate innovative ability with excellence in R&D alone, raising awareness of innovation policies such as:

• the development of innovative clusters
• creation of effective systems of knowledge diffusion
• strengthening the absorption capacity for innovation in firms
• developing the non-technological aspects of innovation
• better co-ordination between the innovation system, the industrial fabric and labour markets
• better recognition of the strategic importance of the institutional framework (e.g. standards) to bring new products to the market.

What is important is that policy-makers and industry alike should not concentrate all their efforts on the development of high-tech activities. Many ‘traditional’ sectors such as the metals have shown a high capacity to innovate and/or have comparative advantages, which should be fully exploited.

Last, but certainly not least, support for the development of the recently created European Institute for Innovation and Technology, as a flagship for industrial research, is a contribution to an industrial development with all the necessary potential.

At company level
Research and Development are strategic investments that require a commitment towards a long-term development of companies instead of short term profit-maximization.

The current crisis demonstrates the need for a profound renovation of the current model of corporate governance, which has proved its limitations. We need a new model capable of giving trade unions and workers a stronger say in corporate strategy and preventing the excesses of financial capitalism that have weakened long-term corporate development. The European Participation Index(3) shows that companies located in countries that recognise a greater participatory role for workers operate more in coherence with social and ecological objectives, higher productivity and greater investment in R&D. Worker representatives’ involvement in companies becomes more effective through the strengthening of information and participation rights both at national and European levels. Workers and trade unions are concerned about the sustainable development of their companies and want to be better involved in shaping the future of their companies via participation in the development of company policies. In order to achieve this they have to be informed and consulted in due time about planned corporate decisions. The EMF’s work with European Works Councils is a key activity for generating collective bargaining power through European Framework Agreements for example. A joint approach of all trade unions in the manufacturing sector offers the potential for increased coordination on worker participation in company decision-making bodies.

Social Dialogue
As mentioned above, an intensive and effective social dialogue has to take place at company level but also at national and European level. The EMF is working in various sectoral social dialogue committees (shipbuilding, steel and foundries), but also with the umbrella organisation of the European metal industry employers, CEEMET in the framework of a European social dialogue committee. Two working groups have been established so far. One is dealing with qualification and training. There is a clear need to improve qualification and training in order to overcome the skills gap that exists in some sectors. The second work groups deals with the possibilities for increased competitiveness and ways of keeping and generating sustainable and quality employment. Social dialogue can only be fruitful when both the metal industry employers and the trade unions are serious about a European approach and a European solution for European problems. The EMF member organisations are.

Mobilising for change
The success of European social dialogue will crucially depend on the ability of the trade union movement to mobilise across borders for a common and solidarity based economic and industrial policy. In the current crisis an employment-orientated and environmentally future looking industrial policy based on a highly skilled and innovative workforce must be a priority. Instead of deflationary austerity policies a European-wide commitment towards industrial jobs and growth is essential. That is why the European trade unions plan for a day of action on 29 September to increase the pressure for an employment-centred recovery strategy.

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Peter Scherrer is the General Secretary of the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF). He was previously a trade union representative of the German metalworkers’ trade union, IG Metall, responsible for the steel industry.

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For more information about European Industrial Policy please click: http://www.industrialpolicy.eu/ and http://www.emf-fem.org/

Footnotes

(1) Greener products refer to less polluting, more energy efficient, full recyclable, raw material efficient
(2) See http://www.industrialpolicy.eu/. On this website one can find an overview about the recent development in the metal working industries as one can see on our http://www.emf-fem.org/ website under the section industrial policy.
(3) Found at www.worker-participation.eu/About-WP/European-Participation-Index-EPI

The global crisis, unemployment and HIV&AIDS: what role for public works programmes?

Francie Lund

South Africa faces a severe and seemingly intractable unemployment problem. The narrow or strictest definition of unemployment produces a rate of approximately 25 percent. This problem existed before the global financial crisis, and has been made worse by it. The government makes unrealistic promises about the numbers of jobs that it will create each year; each year these hopes are dashed.

Unemployment rates are highest amongst the poor and unskilled, higher for women, and higher in rural areas – and in all cases, the situation is worst for African and Coloured people. A 2008 survey showed that the relationship between unemployment and poverty is strong: 31 percent of households have no-one in employment, and the poverty incidence in these households is 81 percent (Leibbrandt et al 2010: 48, using data from the National Income Dynamics Survey – NIDS). Shockingly, more than half of the unemployed said that they had never worked before.

This crippling unemployment problem is accompanied by the HIV&AIDS crisis which also has its worst impact on poor people, especially poor women. Over 5 million of South Africa’s population of 48 million is currently infected. This has led to a crisis of both paid and unpaid care work. Health professionals such as nurses are under strain; thousands of nurses have moved from the public to the private sector. In 2008, 36 percent of health professional posts in the public sector were vacant – nearly half (48 percent) in the rural Eastern Cape, and 28 percent in Gauteng (Health Systems Trust website). Many leave South Africa to work in other countries.

However by far the greatest burden of care work is shouldered by family members and community ‘volunteers’ – mostly African women - who care for both HIV-infected and other ill people. HIV&AIDS increases the general level of ill-health in the population, because of the associated and general increase in infectious diseases, especially among the poor who live in over-crowded housing, with too little decent water, sanitation and ventilation. There has been a very rapid rollout of anti-retroviral (ARV) therapy in the last five years, with nearly a million people now being treated. It is complex and difficult to comply with, and intensive care and support is still needed by those receiving it.

So, the three crises work alongside each other: cripplingly high unemployment, made worse by the global crisis, and a serious crisis of care. What contribution could public works programmes make in addressing the situation?

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the design of public works programmes was negotiated by government, industry and organized labour. In 2004, government announced that the new Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) would be a bridge into formal employment for marginalized unemployed and informal workers; the EPWP was extended in 2008 for five more years.

The EPWP includes social programmes in the fields of early childhood development (ECD) (‘pre-school care’), and in home- and community-based care (HCBC). The HCBC in the EPWP, and other community-based care programmes in the health and social development sectors, are a response to the AIDS crisis of care. Programmes vary a lot, but the basic idea is that a local person, after some training, visits households where there is a sick person, and trains a family member to become more skilled in patient care and support.

It is very unusual, anywhere in the world, to find public works programmes in these fields. They usually focus on building and maintaining physical infrastructure such as roads and dams, or dealing with environmental issues. India’s recent National Rural Employment Guarantee Act guarantees all poor households access to a public works programme for one hundred days a year. It focuses on infrastructural development, not care, though it (notionally) provides child care facilities for programme participants.

Public works programmes are controversial. Their main objective is to mitigate extreme poverty, and they offer short term work at very low rates. Researcher Anna McCord consistently argues that the infrastructural programmes are an inappropriate policy response to the chronic and structural labour market crisis: the combination of short-termism, very low wage rates and poor skills training mean that participants cannot use the opportunity to move out of poverty. They carry the danger of promoting a dual or two-tier labour market. Melanie Samson has shown that the waste management public works programme undermined the creation of new longer term formal jobs.

In the earlier public works programmes in South Africa, organized labour insisted that the work not be presented as enduring employment, and must have a training component. More recently, through discussions inside NEDLAC (the tripartite National Economic Development and Labour Council), a Code of Good Practice for Special Public Works Programmes was developed by the Department of Labour. Melanie Samson, in a study done for the National Education, Health and Allied Worker's Union (NEHAWU) about possibilities of organising care workers, found that few government officials knew about the Code.

There is a huge need for support for care work. Can an argument be made for viewing the HCBC schemes differently, and less critically, than other public works programmes? There are real problems with the HCBC:

• The work varies from being very part time work as a volunteer receiving perhaps compensation for out-of-pocket expenses, all the way to something that is called voluntary work, but is clearly employment, with paid leave, and regular hours. All these varieties of work are exempt from core provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment legislation.
• The care tasks are supposedly those that women can ‘naturally’ do; this perpetuates the gender trap in stereotyping types of work.
• Related to this, within the EPWP wage rates are even lower in the HCBC than in the more ‘masculine’ infrastructural public works programmes; Debbie Budlender has suggested that the gendered wage penalty that occurs in the formal sector (engineers and nurses have the same level of training, but nurses earn less), is also found in public works programmes.
• Some feel that in the HCBC the emphasis is too much on training and not enough on any sort of further job creation once the programme is over.

However, there are positive aspects of the HCBC:

• There is a real demand for community care workers and the EPWP and other community-based care programmes are a response to this.
• Care labour easily draws in women, and is not substitutable by machinery in the same way that much infrastructural work is. The Zibambele roads maintenance programme in KwaZulu-Natal targets women successfully: the placement goes to households so that if the person on the job gets sick, she can be replaced by another available woman household member. It has been a successful programme - but a road-maintenance machine could do in twenty minutes what each woman does in a day.
• It connects unemployed and informally-employed people with those in formal employment, through placement in and supervision by formal paid care workers such as social workers.

Given the strong demand for care workers, and the fuzzy boundaries between paid and unpaid care work, the care field is probably generating substantial informal work for unskilled women workers. Masters and doctoral research at the University of KwaZulu-Natal shows how it can create a bridge into more formal work opportunities – albeit low paid, and in a traditionally women’s sector. This might be exposing participants to the world of work, and simply keeping the hope of further work alive. However, they also hold the potential of trapping women in low paid, unskilled ‘women’s work’.

In trying to develop a strategic position about public works programmes, it would be useful to distinguish between different sectors, as they may throw up quite different opportunities for (rapid) bridging into more secure work. It would be useful for organized labour to consider whether and how to support workers in programmes with a code of practice to organize for their rights.

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Francie Lund is the director of WIEGO Social Protection Programme and a Senior Research Associate, School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

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Further readings

• Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., Finn, A. and Argent, J. 2010. Trends in South African income distribution and poverty since the fall of apartheid. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 101. Brussels: Office for Economic Co-operation and Development. Downloadable from the OECD website.
• Lund, F. with Debbie Budlender. 2009. Paid care providers in South Africa: nurses, domestic workers and home-based care workers. South African Research Report 4 for UNRISD Political Economy of Paid and Unpaid Care Work Project. Downloadable from http://www.unrisd.org/
• Parenzee, Penny and Debbie Budlender. 2007. South Africa’s Expanded Public Works Programme: exploratory research of the social sector. Unpublished paper. Cape Town: ON PAR, and Community Agency for Social Enquiry.
• Samson, M. 2007. ‘Privatizing collective public goods: a case study of street cleaning in Johannesburg, South Africa’, Studies in Political Economy No. 79, Spring.
• Samson, M. 2008. Organising health, home and community based care workers in South Africa. A Research Report commissioned by NALEDI. May 2008.