The True Cost of Doing Business

Conor Cradden[1]

There is a belief widely shared among policymakers that if arguments for a proposal or decision are supported by numbers on a page then somehow this makes that choice less political. It permits the claim that what is being proposed is not really a choice at all but something that the ‘evidence’ demands. This emphasis on quantitative indicators has meant that much policy argument has been displaced into the design of the indicators themselves. Rather than being grounded on purely technical criteria, the design of statistical indicators is a highly politicized process in which different stakeholders struggle to ensure the numbers that emerge will be more compatible with arguments in favour of their policy predilections than those of the opposition.

The World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ (DB) indicators are a shining example of statistics that come with this kind of built-in value judgment. The DB indicators claim to be a guide to the relative ease of establishing and running a business in different countries. This is ‘measured’ on a number of dimensions, including starting up, paying taxes, getting construction permits and enforcing contracts. The indicators allow the construction of rankings, including an overall global ranking that places Singapore at the top – making it the world’s easiest place to do business – and Chad at the bottom.

This might appear to be an innocent enough endeavour. While states obviously have the right to ensure that there is a proper measure of social and political oversight of economic activity, it is also obvious that oversight procedures can be more complicated and more expensive than necessary. However, although the Bank denies that the DB indicators encourage deregulation, the information the indicators provide gives no way of judging whether the cost of conforming with regulation is reasonable in the light of the social, economic and environmental benefits that it produces. They have nothing to say about whether a country might on the whole be better off because of regulation. Since the social costs associated with deregulation are invisible to the DB indicators, governments whose concern is to improve their position in the DB ranking – and in some cases this is even a condition of financial aid from the Bank – have no incentive to take the potentially negative effects of deregulation into account.

Nowhere is the assumption that regulation is only a cost clearer than in the case of the ‘employing workers’ (EW) sub-indicator. A country’s EW score depends on the cost of making employees redundant and a measure called ‘rigidity of employment’, which is a composite index where the highest possible score corresponds with a low minimum wage for beginning employees, easy availability of fixed-term rather than permanent contracts, minimal restrictions on night and weekend working, high maximum permitted weekly working time, a low number of days of paid holiday and minimal requirements for notice and consultation when making redundancies.

Not surprisingly, the EW indicator has attracted criticism from many directions, but most notably the global labour movement. The ICFTU criticised the DB indicators within weeks of their first publication in 2003. Since then the Confederation, and subsequently the ITUC, has set out objections on a number of occasions, both in direct communication with the Bank and in public papers. In 2007, the ILO joined the debate, producing an official paper[2] that criticised the EW indicator on technical grounds, but also because of what it called problems with ‘policy coherence’ – in other words, the EW indicators cut directly across the ILO’s own, arguably more legitimate policies. The ILO argued that the view that “reducing protection to a minimum and maximizing flexibility is always the best option” was badly mistaken and that the EW indicator was “a poor indicator of the investment climate and labour market performance”.

The paper sparked a series of exchanges between the ILO and the Bank that culminated in the establishment of a consultative group (CG) to serve as a ‘source of advice’ on revising the EW indicator. Around the same time – early in 2009 – pressure from the global unions led to the Bank agreeing that at least until the group reported, the EW indicator would not be included in the calculation of the overall DB ranking nor used as a basis for policy advice. The consultative group included senior Bank and ILO officials together with global union, employer and OECD representatives. There were also three independent members, a labour law expert, a social entrepreneur and a public servant.

The ILO’s decision to participate in the CG will not have been taken lightly – even though in principle all of the members were acting in their personal capacity. Not participating would have meant missing a rare opportunity to have an impact on an influential indicator, but participating was arguably a gamble. The risk was that the group would come up with conclusions that did not adequately respond to the ILO’s criticisms but that the Bank would put its recommendations into effect anyway. If the ILO wanted to object, it would be forced to get into a public argument with the Bank about the adequacy of an indicator in whose revision two of its senior officials had just participated.

Now that the CG has produced its final report[3] it is not obvious that the gamble paid off. The solution proposed to the principal problem – the fact that lower standards of labour protection receive a higher score – is hardly adequate. Three elements of the indicator – minimum weekly rest periods, paid holiday entitlement and the level and means of setting the minimum wage – have been changed from being in a simple inverse relationship with the indicator score (the lower the better) to a kind of ‘banding’ system in which the policy target is to have these protections fall within a lower and an upper limit. Not enough holiday and a country will not receive the maximum possible score, but the same is true for what is deemed to be too much holiday. A similar change is proposed for maximum weekly working time. The ranking on the minimum wage indicator for countries that have one remains inversely related to the ratio of the wage to the average value added per worker, but countries that have no minimum wage no longer receive the best possible score. This is reserved for systems in which the minimum wage is set by collective bargaining – as long as it applies to less than half the manufacturing sector, or does not apply to firms not party to it – and systems in which trainees or apprentices are excluded.

The report of the CG makes it clear that it was split on whether the changes to the EW indicator are adequate. ‘One view’ was that the modifications dealt with the substantial problems and that the EW indicator should be reintegrated into the overall DB indicators. A ‘second view’, on the other hand, “noted that EWI did not adequately reflect worker protections even after the amendments made, and that the Doing Business report should reflect labour regulations holistically, or not at all”. This second view also argued that if the EW indicator was to continue to be used, there should also be a separate, quantitative ‘worker protection measures’ indicator published alongside the DB indicators. However, although this idea was discussed by the CG[4], it failed to agree a recommendation on the issue.

The ILO now has to decide whether to carry on working with the Bank. If it does not, the Bank will probably put the modified indicator back into use, and may also go back to basing policy advice on the EW indicator. Certainly the ILO doesn’t have to endorse the revised indicator, but if it wants to avoid a public argument, the best it can do is maintain a studied neutrality on the issue. The fact remains, though, that the DB indicator is still a barrier to the improvement of working conditions and quietly accepting its existence would be cowardly at best. The obvious question is why the ILO does not try to take the collaboration implied in the consultative group one step further and to work to persuade the Bank that there ought indeed to be an official, jointly developed worker protection indicator. The stakes are not so high here since the ILO clearly has moral and technical authority on the issue that the Bank cannot claim.

So why the deafening silence from the ILO? There has been no comment on the report of the CG, still less any indication of whether the ILO wants to carry on working with the Bank. In fact, the problem for the ILO is less with the outside world than its own constituents. The possibility of producing a ‘decent work’ indicator has been floating around for more than 10 years. That such an indicator has not (yet) been developed is partly a reflection of the traditional reluctance of employers and governments to allow themselves to be ranked, and partly a reflection of disagreement about whether such an indicator should be focused on outcome measures – the extent to which decent work is a reality for workers on the ground – or regulation – the extent to which the formal rules conform with ILO policies. These are difficult questions, but making a determined effort to resolve them is likely to be less costly for the ILO than allowing the Bank to continue to use and promote its EW indicator.

[1] Disclosure: the author is married to an ILO official. The official in question has no input into ILO policy-making in the areas under discussion in this article.
[2] http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_085125.pdf
[3] http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%0Business/Documents/Methodology/EWI/Final-EWICG-April-2011.doc
[4] http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/Methodology/EWI/Annexes-EWICG-April-2011.doc

---

Download this article as pdf

---

Conor Cradden is a research fellow in the Department of Sociology at the University of Geneva and a partner in Public World, a London-based research and policy consultancy.

---

Is the Eurozone doomed to fail?

Jacques Sapir

The eurozone is currently undergoing a crisis of historic importance, which results in the accumulation of sovereign debt in eurozone countries and reveals the internal defects of the eurozone.

Since the beginning of 2010, the crisis in several EU countries has resulted in a faster growth of interest rates compared to those of Germany. This is known as interest rate “spreads” and has challenged the single real accomplishment of the eurozone: the relative convergence between countries on the debt market that began in 2000. This has been fuelled by the huge growth of sovereign debts in the wake of the 2007 crisis. But even this development could be linked to the euro as prior to the crisis it allowed a downturn of interest rates, which then facilitated the build-up of the large debt, both private and public, in most eurozone countries.

Table 1: Situation at the beginning of the crisis (December 31 2009) 

Source: C Lapavitsas et alii, “The Eurozone Between Austerity and Default”, RMF-Research on Money and Finance, occasional report, September 2010, available at www.researchonmoneyandfinance.org

When the difference between the interest rates of one country and those of Germany exceeded 300 points (the Irish debt reached its peak at 399 points[1]), it was clear that the eurozone had entered troubled waters. The homogenization process had been suspended, and the rates in Greece remained very high. The growth of the rate spread was actually caused by the deterioration of the debt situation in Greece followed by Spain, Portugal and Ireland[2].

Beyond the “at risk” countries, we can see the process of interest rates divergence going one step further. For example, Italy resumed issuing futures on government bonds in September 2009 (a practice that was suspended in 1999 when the euro was introduced). This shows operators are seeking to prevent new problems in this segment of the government securities market[3]. The fact that Italy reverted to this type of emission indicates that the euro is fast losing its protective role. The same can be said about worries now openly voiced on Belgium.

Yet, advocates of the euro stressed this role during the crisis. They argued that the euro helped member countries to avoid the consequences of their currencies fluctuating violently against one another. Nevertheless, these fluctuations have been possible because of the long standing decision to move to complete convertibility (capital-account convertibility). Note also that the speculation on exchange rates has been replaced by speculation on interest rates. One wonders what would have been the outcome had capital controls been introduced. But capital controls have been strictly prohibited under the provision of Article 63 of the Lisbon Treaty.

However, it is important to note that the introduction of capital controls is recommended by the IMF[4] to fight speculation. They could have helped avoid currency swings while giving eurozone countries the possibility to adapt their exchange rate to the massive divergence in the real cost of labour experienced in Europe since 2002.

This openness has made countries totally dependent on the eurozone. The adoption of a single exchange rate and the overvaluation that has characterised the euro since 2003 has also increased the economic pressure on certain members.

The rigid pressure of the single currency “noose” forces some eurozone countries to resort to ongoing growth of their budget deficits[5], which raises questions on the competitive deflationary policy of the Stability and Growth Pact within the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and might have serious recessionary consequences for Europe. We cannot exclude the possibility that some countries may leave the eurozone[6]. Even the withdrawal of one country would cause a strong speculative movement, which would make the participation of others ever more expensive and eventually impossible.

When the euro crisis broke in April 2010[7], it had two dimensions: momentary dimension (the debt crisis in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) and a more important structural dimension. The crisis was triggered by the growing lack of confidence among financial markets that countries with large debts were going to be able to repay them. The crisis began in Greece and then attacked Ireland, Portugal and Spain. It is now obvious that Italy will be next, as it was already the target of speculative attacks in July.

The plan adopted on May 9–10 2010 was supposed to put an end to the crisis. However, the market response shows that the lack of confidence has increased. The plan has been revamped several times, but each modification has only served to push back problems for one or two months. Market speculation reveals the following:

(1) This plan does not announce a clear commitment by donor countries as a large part of the funds are just a credit guarantee.

(2) The total sum is not enough to cover the estimated financial needs of 900–1000 billion euro for the three countries already targeted by the plan (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal). This amount is clearly short of what would be needed if Spain were to be rescued too. The default rate on bank credit has already reached 6.2% of the credit amount. With the planned end of the unemployment benefit package by December 2011, the default rate is likely to surge even higher, maybe to 10%.

(3) Some countries, such as Germany, are not ready to commit to obligations.

This plan has clearly been designed as an attempt to gain time. The only relevant action has been the ECB’s decision to buy out government and private debt, but even this is not completely satisfactory: only monetization of some part of the debt could give real breathing space. In early May Greece asked for more money, and Portugal and Ireland are asking for a renegotiation of their interest rates.

What options are left?

Fiscal austerity plans are pushing some countries to their limits. The fiscal adjustment needed to stabilize the sovereign debt is too great to be swallowed by different countries. What is more, the deflationary spill over effect has not been computed nor introduced in various forecasts presented by governments or independent research centres.

The cumulative effect of these different fiscal adjustment plans is likely to plunge the eurozone into a previously unknown depression.
The only possible solution would be a default on the sovereign debt for some countries (Greece and Portugal and maybe Ireland). But the economic competitiveness of these countries cannot be rebuilt without a strong devaluation. On the other hand, the Russian experience of 1998 is showing that long-term benefits can outweigh short-term pain. 

Table 2: Fiscal adjustment needed to keep the sovereign debt at its 2010 level

Source: Author’s computations and CEMI-EHESS database

However, such devaluation could not be obtained within the eurozone: these countries are then bound to leave it, maybe momentarily.
Problems will not stop with Greece and Portugal. While some of the eurozone countries would not benefit from a possible devaluation (Germany, Netherlands, Finland), others would, such as Ireland, France or Italy. Large budget transfers have not backed the single currency system adopted for the euro. Germany continues strongly opposing the very principle of turning the single currency into a transfer zone. But, as the single currency has prevented adjustments of the exchange rate, this left fiscal adjustment as the only way open. Fiscal adjustments will not be sustainable.

The coming crisis could mean the beginning of the end for the euro.

[1] G.J. Neuger and S Kennedy (2009), “Crisis Spawns Drive to Fixe the Euro with More Rules, ties (Update 1)”, Bloomberg, Feb 17
[2] E. Ross Thomas (2009), “Spain Downgraded by S&P as Slump swell Budget Gap”, Bloomberg, Jan 19
[3] A. Worrachate (2009), “Italian Bond Futures offer Proxy to Hedge Greek, Irish Debt”, Bloomberg, Sep 11
[4] J. Ostry et al. (2010), Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls, International Monetary Fund Staff Position Note, Washington D.C.: IMF
[5] On the depressive effects of the euro, see J. Bibow (2007), “Global Imbalances, Bretton Woods II and Euroland’s Role in All This” in J. Bibow and A. Terzi (eds.), Euroland and the World Economy: Global Player or Global Drag?, New York: Palgrave Macmillan
[6] S. Keendy and T.R. Keebe (2010), “Feldstein says Greece will Default and Portugal May Be Next”, Business Week, June 30
[7] A. Moses and D.S. Harrington (2010), “Bank Swaps, Libor Show Doubt on Euro Bailout”, Bloomberg, May 11

---

Download this article as pdf

---

Jacques Sapir is Professor of economics and Director of the CEMI Research Centre at EHESS (Paris), which focuses on Russia and CIS countries and on international development. He is the author of several books on the Russian economy, international finance and economic theory, notably (2000) “Les trous noirs de la science économique. Essai sur l'impossibilité de penser le temps et l'argent”, Paris: Albin Michel and (2011) “La Démondialisation”, Paris: Le Seuil.

---

Further references
P. Dobson (2010), “European Yield Spreads Widen on Concern Debt Crisis Deepening”, Business Week, June 30
F. Cachia (2008), Les effets de l’appréciation de l’Euro sur l’économie française, Note de Synthèse de l’INSEE, Paris: INSEE

---

Taxing Finance

Toby Sanger

The financial and economic crisis has led to a long overdue re-evaluation of the role, regulation and taxation of the financial industry around the world.

The IMF estimated that the crisis would cost G20 countries over $1 trillion in increased deficits; costs citizens are now paying for through public spending cuts, austerity measures and consumption tax increases. This alone is a good reason for the unprecedented interest in introducing new taxes on banking and the finance industry. Despite this, the commitment by G20 leaders at their September 2009 summit that the “financial sector should make a fair and substantial contribution” towards paying for some of the costs of the crisis remains unfulfilled.

Following strong advocacy by civil society and labour organisations, a significant advance was made in June 2011 when the European Commission recommended a European financial transactions tax be introduced by 2018 at the latest. It estimated this would generate €37 billion (US$52 billion) a year to fund the European Union’s budget activities.

Beyond paying for some of the costs of the crisis, there are also a number of other compelling reasons for increasing taxation of the financial sector.

Financial sector is too big
Whether considered from a critical political economy or a more conventional neo-liberal perspective, there is broader recognition that the financial sector has grown “too big” for the good of the economy, as a recent IMF report suggested. Finance is an intermediary industry, and doesn’t directly produce products with end-use values for people, so it can divert resources from other more productive areas. Excessive salaries and bonuses paid to engineering graduates to create new financial products and derivatives instead of working to meet more fundamental needs reflects the human resources side of this equation.

Tax changes have provided large benefits and preferences for finance
Major tax changes introduced over the past decades inspired by supply-side economics provided large benefits to the financial sector and to highly-compensated individuals in the industry. These include: preferential tax rates for capital gains and investment income, increasing dependence on consumption-based value-added taxes (which largely exempt financial services), cuts to corporate taxes, reductions in higher income tax rates, as well as the growing use of tax havens.

Reducing incentives for excessive risk-taking
Even from a micro-economic efficiency approach, there is recognition that tax changes increase incentives for short-term speculation and excessive risk-taking in the financial sector, as the IMF and the European Commission have acknowledged. Bankruptcy and limited liability laws have limited downside risk for corporations for centuries. Following the financial crisis, there is also more focus on the damage caused to the entire economy by systemically risky activities, with the implicit public guarantee for “too big to fail” financial corporations.

Some have argued that the exponential growth of trading in financial derivatives — futures, options, swaps, etc. — has magnified financial instability instead of reducing volatility as they were supposed to. The value of financial derivatives outstanding now amounts to over ten times the value of annual global economic output. Clearly much of this involves investments designed to increase profit through leverage and risky speculation instead of hedging to insure underlying investments against economic fluctuations.

There’s been little effort to contain or control this. Financial derivatives have been largely unregulated; unlike transactions for most other goods and services, only a few countries apply taxes to a broad range, let alone any financial transactions; the growth in derivatives, hedge funds, private equity and increasing use of secretive tax havens has not only siphoned revenues from national governments, but also made them more vulnerable to the power of financial capital.

There should be little surprise that pressure exerted by popular groups for new taxes on finance, such as the Robin Hood Tax campaign, is now being supported by many politicians and political leaders from different sides of the political spectrum. The common appeal for international development, anti-poverty, economists and political activists is that new taxes on finance could not just to help pay for the costs of the crisis and provide funding for global social and environmental needs, but also to tame the financial industry and help prevent further financial crises.

The leading group on innovative financing for development has endorsed financial or currency transactions taxes at low rates to raise revenues at the global level to fight poverty and climate change. Proponents estimate that a broad-based tax at 0.05% on all financial transactions could generate US$200 to $600 billion a year in revenues globally — significant funding for global development and environmental priorities.

The idea of special taxes on banks and financial transactions is neither new nor speculative. In 1936, John Maynard Keynes wrote in his General Theory that “the introduction of a substantial government transfer tax on all transactions might prove to be the most serviceable reform available, with a view towards mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprise in the United States.”

Nobel-prize winning economist James Tobin applied Keynes’ idea when he proposed an international tax on currency transactions “to throw sand in the wheels” of international finance, reduce speculation and cushion exchange rate fluctuations after the Bretton Woods monetary system broke down in 1972.

Many countries already have long-standing and effective taxes on certain financial transactions. The UK’s Stamp Duty tax, which includes a 0.5% tax on most equity transactions, has been in existence since 1694 and raises over US$5 billion in revenues annually. Switzerland also levies a tax on transactions of stocks and bonds. China levies a tax on trading in stocks, and adjusts the rate depending on how much they want to cool down or stimulate their stock market. Taiwan not only taxes transactions of stock and bonds, but a tax at a lower rate on transactions of financial derivatives such as options and futures. Other countries have financial transactions taxes, although a number have been eliminated since the 1990s.

Given this experience, there is no question that financial transactions taxes are not only feasible, but can be effective and raise decent amounts of revenue at a low administrative cost without much economic disruption. The greater interest now is in even broader-based taxes to also cover currencies and financial derivatives. Because much of this trading is global and highly mobile, financial transactions taxes in these areas would be much more effective if established through global or multi-lateral agreements.

Of the US$600 billion figure for a 0.05% tax on all financial transactions, about 80% is estimated to come from trading in derivatives. However, there is considerable uncertainty about the impact of a tax on trading on different types of derivatives and therefore on how much revenue would be raised. With a tax based on the notional value of the derivative contract, in some cases even a small tax rate could exceed the value of the actual premium paid. A global FTT might not raise US$600 billion a year and cure all the ills of the global economy, but it could certainly raise significant sums while improving the functioning of the economy. There is solid research showing that a tax at a rate of 0.005% just on transactions of major global currencies could generate over US$30 billion annually at a low administrative cost with little impact on markets. The G20 and other countries should join with the European Commission proposal to establish broader-based financial transactions taxes at the international level, but agree to direct half the funds generated to international development and climate justice priorities.

There’s also no reason why national governments can’t proceed with increasing other taxes on finance. There’s a strong argument for Financial Activities Taxes to compensate for the broad exemption of financial services from most national value-added tax systems. As proposed by the IMF, a 5% tax on profits and compensation in the financial sector would form a good proxy for value-added by the industry and could generate approximately significant revenues in many countries.

Tax preferences that have provided disproportionate benefits to the financial industry and even increased the incentives for speculative behaviour should also be eliminated. These include reduced tax rates for capital gains, stock options and other forms of financial investment income. There’s also solid justification for a higher corporate tax rate on bank and large financial sector firms given the implicit guarantee governments provide to rescue them from failure.

These tax changes will not fix all problems with finance, nor will they eliminate speculation and generate all the revenues we need for global poverty and environmental challenges. But at a time when governments have reacted to the financial crisis by penalizing people with cuts to public spending, increasing taxes on finance would not only be much fairer but also better for the health of the economy.

---

Download this article as pdf

---

Toby Sanger is a CCPA research associate and senior economist with the Canadian Union of Public Employees. He previously worked as principal economic policy advisor to the Ontario Minister of Finance and as chief economist for the Yukon government.

---

Further reading
Toby Sanger (April 2011), Fair Shares: How Banks, Brokers and the Financial Industry Can Pay Fairer Taxes, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives

---

Building Progressive Alliances

Asbjørn Wahl

The social conflict in Europe has intensified strongly over the past couple of years, in the wake of the financial crisis. The labour and trade union movement has been on the defensive ever since the neoliberal offensive started around 1980. The balance of power in our societies has thus shifted enormously over the past 30 years - from labour to capital, from democracy to market forces. Time is ripe, therefore, to fight back, to build broad social alliances and to reassess our strategies and tactics.

In this article I will take a closer look at the current situation, address the question of alliance building and particularly summarise some of the experiences we have had in building alliances in Norway. My point of departure is that social development is a question of power, social power, and strength. If we are not able to mobilise sufficient social power behind our many excellent demands, they will only end up as wishful thinking.

The current situation

The situation in Europe is going from bad to worse. Subsequent to the financial crisis, we are now facing a crisis of state financing, which is gradually turning into a deep social and political crisis. Add to this the environmental and climate crisis, and the future looks rather dramatic.

Perhaps we should have expected the financial crisis to be followed by strict regulation of financial capital and an end to the neoliberal experiments which contributed so strongly to it. However, quite the opposite has happened, neoliberals are still running the business, both politically and financially. They have even been able to win hegemony for their interpretation of the crisis. It is no longer the capitalist crisis which has led to the mess, but ordinary people who have been living beyond their means. Workers and pensioners have to foot the bill, after the financial institutions and speculators were rescued by governments. This has led to reactionary and anti-social austerity policies across Europe, including fierce attacks on trade unions as well as on wages, pensions and welfare services.

One of the reasons for this development is the weak resistance from trade unions and social forces in Europe. As long as we are not able to shift the balance of forces in society, the neoliberals will continue their silent revolution (as EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso has characterised the current attempts to further de-democratise and take control over economic government in the EU). Already in eight of the EU member states public sector wages have been cut and collective agreements set aside through political decrees – without negotiations with trade unions concerned. While employers and governments are thus breaking completely with post-war consensus policies, many trade unions are still clinging to the illusion of a working social partnership, in which reasonable employers will be convinced by our arguments. However, this consensus was based on a particular balance of power which has shifted enormously during the neoliberal era of the past 30 years. What is going on now is therefore a fierce interest-based struggle, and every sign tells us that the confrontations will increase in strength. We are under attack, and it is a matter of urgency to fight back.

Build alliances
In order to confront the attacks, we have to reorient our unions, and to build broad social alliances to increase our strength. This is a struggle for power, and the struggle has to be political (not party political, but political in terms of addressing social development in the broad sense). The aim is to widen the social basis of our struggle. To that end, we will have to broaden the perspective of our policies and demands.

Alliances can change according to the situation and the aim of our struggle. In the current situation, in which the very foundation of our social achievements is being attacked, it is the broad social alliances which are decisive. In other words, we have to identify common interests with other groups in society. Thus, our alliance policy has to be built on class analyses and practice, not on empty rhetoric and lip service.

Firstly, we have to strengthen our unity within the trade union movement, i.e. in the working class itself, across the divides between public and private, blue collar and white collar, skilled and unskilled, workers and professionals, employed and unemployed, male and female, immigrants and domestically based, as well as formal and informal workers. Secondly, we should build alliances between social classes and strata, like with important parts of the middle class, of peasants, of youth and of women who can be mobilised in favour of social protection and progress. Thirdly, progressive academics and researchers, NGOs and organisations and campaigns which have an understanding of the broader social context are important social allies. Fourthly, and finally, due to the alarming climate crisis, we should seek alliances with those parts of the environmental movement which have an understanding of the social conflict and social justice.

Norwegian experiences
In Norway we have been building alliances between trade unions and other organisations and movements for many years. The one I have been in charge of, the Campaign for the Welfare State, was initiated in 1999, by six trade unions in the public sector. Gradually we grew, firstly inside the trade union movement, but then also among other organisations, such as of retired people, peasants, socially excluded people, users of welfare services, women and students. All in all we gathered organisations with more than one million members, which is not bad in a country with only approximately five million inhabitants. Of course there are different levels of participation among these organisations, but even the support from the more passive ones has given us a lot in terms of legitimacy in the social struggle.

During the general election in 2005 this alliance, in cooperation with other organisations and the broad trade union movement, succeeded in changing the political situation in Norway. It was a favourable climate for change because the existing centre-right government was highly unpopular due to its policies of privatisation and deregulation. Further, the Labour Party had been strongly punished by the voters four years earlier, when it achieved the lowest support in an election since 1924, because of its move to the right. This gave us an opportunity to push the Labour Party to the left and into a coalition with the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party. Due to this pressure, all the three parties campaigned on an anti-privatisation platform, won the election, and formed a government based on the most progressive political platform in Europe.

More independent – more political

We can identify four main pillars which contributed to this success:

• Focus on alternative analyses – a system critical view of current developments.
• The building of new, broad and untraditional alliances.
• The development of concrete alternatives to privatisation and marketisation.
• The development of trade unions as independent political actors.

These steps contributed to polarising the struggle between the Right and the Left, something which gave people clear political alternatives and helped mobilise them for progressive change.

The 2005 red-green government in Norway started off by carrying through a number of progressive policies. However, as time went by, and the pressure from the movement declined, the government began to slide back to old political positions. Even if great parts of the trade union movement politically had become more independent from the Labour Party, other parts were still too loyal to oppose and to keep up the pressure when welfare provisions were weakened and undermined by ‘their own’ government. It is exactly the move to the right of the traditional Social Democratic/Socialist Parties which has made it necessary for trade unions in the current situation to become more independent politically and to take on a wider political responsibility and, not least, to keep up the pressure on the government after it has won the election and taken power.

So far we have only seen the beginning of the social and political crisis in Europe. In other words, it is time for trade unions which are old-fashioned, afraid of new alliances, afraid of losing control, more or less married to social democratic/socialist parties and locked in by an uninhibited belief in social partnership, to reassess their position. Social resistance to the austerity policies is increasing across Europe, but there is a lack of European coordination and leadership. We have to support those who struggle and follow their example. We have to turn the defensive into an offensive. It is all about power, not only addressing power, but taking power, if we are to stop the current development towards an ever more authoritarian and anti-social Europe.

---

Download this article as pdf

---

Asbjørn Wahl is Director of the broad Campaign for the Welfare State in Norway and Adviser to the Norwegian Union of Municipal and General Employees. He is also Vice Chair of the Road Transport Workers’ Section of the International Transport Workers’ Federation.

---

Brazil, India and South Africa: Low Spill-Over, High Resilience of Financial Sector

Martina Metzger

The course of the global financial crisis displayed widespread flaws in regulation and supervisory failure. The financial sectors of advanced countries piled up systemic risk comprising almost all financial institutions. In addition, high cross-border exposure between the financial institutions resulted in a core meltdown when the bubble burst in 2008. The financial sectors of many advanced countries risked collapse, meaning unprecedented monetary and fiscal intervention by policy authorities was necessary to stabilise the situation.

In contrast, many emerging market economies weathered the financial tsunami not only better than expected in terms of financial and macroeconomic stability given their previous performances during crises, but also better than G7 countries. Against this backdrop, we begin to question which factors account for the low impact of the global financial crisis and which features might explain the strong resilience of emerging markets’ financial sectors. The countries under consideration here are Brazil, India and South Africa. Apart from being heavy weights in their respective regions and continents, the financial sectors of these three countries showed a remarkable resilience to the global financial turmoil.

LOW SPILL-OVER TO BRAZIL, INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
With the default of Lehman Brothers, the US subprime crisis transformed into a global financial crisis, also affecting the financial markets of emerging market economies. Apart from a short period of stress in the second half of 2008 resulting in steep stock market corrections and a strong volatility of prices, in particular exchange rates, financial sectors in Brazil, India and South Africa proved to be robust.

First round effects or direct impacts of the global financial crisis on emerging market economies in general and on Brazil, India and South Africa in particular were low, as exposure of their domestic financial institutions to toxic assets had been small. There was only minimal investment in complex instruments and marginal exposure to risky financial products – marginal to such an extent that it was not necessary for regulatory authorities to fall back on counter-actions.

In addition, the share of foreign banks with majority ownership in the domestic financial system is negligible in India and South Africa, while in Brazil it is still low compared with more affected emerging market economies or transition countries; hence direct spill-over from banking headquarters in advanced countries to host countries was limited.

However, there had been considerable second-round effects with the financial sector and more importantly the trade sector as main transmission channels. The real economy had to bear the major burden: in the wake of declining exports, industrial production, investment and employment fell and real growth was depressed. All three countries slipped into a recession with a sharp slump of real growth in 2009.

POLICY RESPONSES
Despite some differences in the magnitude of the spill-over and severity of the transmission channels, policy responses by fiscal and monetary authorities of the three countries under consideration were quite similar. First, central banks increased liquidity by cutting policy rates; in a second step central banks reduced reserve requirements and compulsory deposits to provide additional liquidity to credit institutions; a third measure covered companies and banks which were affected by the restricted access to international and domestic finance, in particular trade finance. All in all, there was a sizeable monetary accommodation to cushion liquidity shortages and credit crunches in order to stabilise the domestic financial sector. Additional to the monetary policy measures fiscal policy initiated a package of measures with discretionary counter-cyclical instruments to dampen negative impacts of the global financial crisis on domestic growth and employment.

The fiscal stimulus packages focused on stabilising the level of domestic demand. Governments provided finance to mitigate the most severe impacts on vulnerable groups, in particular poor and low-income households as well as small-and-medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, the governments of India and South Africa extended pre-crisis infrastructure programmes and initiated new ones in order to strengthen their economies’ potential to grow and at best to increase the economic inclusiveness.

In contrast to previous times of crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, this time central banks and governments of the three countries disposed over adequate policy space to use multiple instruments, including non-conventional monetary measures and counter-cyclical fiscal measures.

FEATURES OF FINANCIAL SECTOR RESILIENCE
Conventional wisdom suggests that the capacity to manage a crisis mainly depends on what policy has realised during good times, e.g. the creation of sound financial institutions, the improvement of regulatory and institutional capacities, the deepening and broadening of domestic financial markets and the design of an adequate monetary and fiscal framework which allows the involved institutions to work out a consistent response to a crisis in a coordinated way. Even so, the low impact that the financial meltdown in advanced countries had on the financial sectors of Brazil, India and South Africa raises the question of whether and to what extent specific characteristics and features of their financial market architecture and regulatory approaches can explain such high resilience.

There are four outstanding factors which might claim to have insulated the financial sector of these three countries from the worst woes of the global financial crisis. First, one key problem of past crises has been high foreign debt and associated currency and maturity mismatches; balance sheet effects were a major factor which exposed developing countries and emerging market economies most to hazard with regards to macroeconomic stability and development. Accordingly, Brazil, India and South Africa reduced their outstanding foreign debt exposure over time and from the turn of the millennium also succeeded in increasing their foreign exchange reserves.

Second, the macro-prudential approach which is applied by the central banks of Brazil, India and South Africa is another distinguishing mark of their financial architecture. As experience has shown that financial sector-related crises are an important feature of market economies, their central bank policy takes into account financial stability considerations – a task which many central banks in advanced countries rejected due to a perceived conflict of interest with the objective of price stability.

Third, another aspect in the financial market regulation shared by the three countries is the rule-based rather than principle-based approach. A rule-based approach with universal standards entails less forbearance and enables less regulatory arbitrage; supervisors’ decisions are based on transparent and reliable indicators, e.g. equity capital, non-performing loans or credit ratios. Hence, regulation based on a rule-based approach is easier to impose and decisions can be taken quicker which is backing pre-emptive surveillance.

Fourth, Brazil, India and South Africa exhibit country-specific features in a narrow sense, which contributed to the resilience of their financial systems. With regard to Brazil, for instance, it is worth mentioning that the supervision covers all financial institutions, including hedge funds and OTC derivative markets; another particularity is the so-called Public Hearing Process for regulatory proposals concerning securities. India, on the other hand, developed a special framework for non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) with an explicit treatment and deliberate prudential norms of those entities. Furthermore, banks have to make provisions for a counter-cyclical Investment Fluctuation Reserve, which bears some resemblance to the currently debated liquidity buffers by the Financial Stability Board. In South Africa the regulation on collective investment schemes, including hedge funds, comprises a ban on leverage and short selling strategies. With the National Credit Act, South Africa also developed a broad spectrum of instruments to protect consumer rights. In case of complaints by consumers and disputes with credit providers, including banks, the National Consumer Tribunal enforces a hearing process at which end it can completely suspend the credit agreement to the disadvantage of the credit provider when proved reckless.

Taking these features into account it comes as no surprise that banks in the three countries are on average sound, and banking behaviour has adapted to legal restrictions and norms; they even hold reserves and liquidity in excess of regulatory requirements, something considered inefficient and non-innovative before the crisis. More importantly, at the time of writing, banks in Brazil, India and South Africa had not been infected by the notorious originate-and-distribute virus of granting loans, which was a major driver of the credit and securitisation bubble which finally resulted in the global financial crisis; instead, they still execute the original banking model with a buy-and-hold strategy based on thorough credit assessment and borrower supervision.

In sum, the combination of a reduction of foreign debt exposure, a macro-prudential approach in supervision and a rule-based approach in regulation, complemented by a variety of country-specific rules applied by these countries even before the crisis, together with non-orthodox monetary and fiscal policies during the crisis can be identified as the main features of economic success.

The high resilience of the financial sectors of Brazil, India and South Africa is a result of continuously strengthening financial sector institutions and adjusting the regulatory framework to the respective country’s needs and vulnerabilities. This is an ongoing process which started two decades ago. Crisis heritage has proven a major motivation for macroeconomic and financial sector improvements while at the same time Brazil, India and South Africa constructively turned the drastic experience into a cautious and thorough handling of financial sector-related issues. In the hostile environment of a global financial crisis, the specific art of supervision performed by Brazil, India and South Africa was put to test – and impressively passed it.

---

Download this article as pdf

---

Martina Metzger is the executive director of the Berlin Institute of Financial Market Research (BIF). Before joining BIF, she taught macroeconomics at several universities and worked with UNCTAD. Her areas of interest include financial market development in emerging market economies, macroeconomic stabilization and sustainable development.

---

FURTHER READING:
Martina Metzger and Günther Taube (2010), ‘The Rise of Emerging Markets’ Financial Market Architecture: Constituting New Roles in the Global Financial Governance’, BIF Working Papers on Financial Markets

---